

International Organizations (PSCI 6316) Course Syllabus

The University of Texas at Dallas – Fall 2013
Thu 4-6:45pm in SLC 1.202

Professor Contact Information

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Office Hours Friday 10-11:30am

Course Pre-requisites, Co-requisites, and/or Other Restrictions

All students in this course should have already taken *PSCI 5301 – Proseminar in Democratization, Globalization and International Relations*. Additionally, those who have had a research design course will be much better positioned for the research paper requirement.

Course Description

The study of international organizations has evolved from one where scholars knew a particular organization with great precision to a much broader study of international cooperation and now to something of a synthesis between the two. We'll largely ignore the first stage and pick the debate up from the very general theoretical debates of the 1980s and 1990s to new issue-specific work done more recently. This has the advantage of familiarizing you with the general theoretical debates and demonstrating how that plays out in multiple issue areas.

Student Learning Objectives/Outcomes

The primary purpose of this class is to familiarize students with the scholarly study of international organizations, to the point that they can contribute to research programs in the field. This involves knowing the literatures as they currently exist, developing critical perspectives on those literatures, and finding opportunities for new contributions of original research. Additionally, students are expected to communicate their ideas and, if applicable, findings, to their fellow students in conference-style presentations and to develop better academic writing skills through class assignments.

Required Textbooks and Materials

Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books. Many editions, of this, any will suffice.

Acharya, Amitav, and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds. 2007. *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-69942-6.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stone, Randall W. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Assignments & Academic Calendar

Note: A few journals are abbreviated due to their proliferation in the following list.

IO=International Organization; AJPS=American Journal of Political Science; APSR=American Political Science Review; WP=World Politics.

Week One: Introductions and Background – TBA (No class on August 29)

- * Simmons, Beth A., and Lisa Martin. 2002. International Organizations and Institutions. In *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, 192-211. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Alexander Thompson & Duncan Snidal. 2000. IO. In B. Bouckaert & G. DeGeest, eds., *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*. (online: <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/9800book.pdf>)

Week Two: Decentralized Cooperation– September 5

Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Week Three: Power and Hegemony– Sept. 12

- Grieco, Joseph. 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation. *IO* 42 (3):486-507.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1991. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. *WP* 43 (3):336-66.
- Martin, Lisa. 1992. Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. *International Organization* 46 (4):765-92.
- Fearon, James. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *IO* 52(2): 269-305.
- * Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World*, chap. 2 & 3.

Week Four: Security Cooperation/Alliances – Sept. 19

- Snyder, Glenn H. 1990. Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut. *Journal of International Affairs* 44 (1):103-24.
- Glaser, Charles. 1997. The Security Dilemma Revisited. *WP* 50 (1):171-201.
- Sandler, Todd. 1999. Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (6):727-47.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2000. Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation. *IO* 54 (2):325-57.
- Wallander, Celeste A. 2000. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. *IO* 54 (4):705-535.
- Hemmer, Christopher, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2002. Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism. *IO* 56 (3):575-607.

Week Five: Compliance – Sept. 26

- [Review] Simmons, Beth. 1998. Compliance with International Agreements. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1):75-94.
 - Downs, George, and Michael A. Jones. 2002. Reputation, Compliance, and International Law. *Journal of Legal Studies* 31 (S1):S95-S114.
 - Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime. *IO* 60 (4):935-67.
 - Simmons, B. A. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *APSR* 94 (4):819-35.
 - von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *APSR* 99 (4):611-22.
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Simmons, Beth A., and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods. *APSR* 99 (4):623-31.

Week Six: United Nations – Oct. 3

Claude, Inis. 1966. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. *IO* 20 (3): 367-79.

Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *IO* 60: 1-34.

Kuziemko, Ilyana, and Eric Werker. 2006. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (5):905-30.

Voeten, Erik. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. *APSR* 95 (4):845-58.

Hosli, Maeleine O., Rebecca Moody, Bryan O'Donovan, Serguei Kaniovski, and Anna C. H. Little. 2011. Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform. *Review of International Organizations* 6 (2):163-87.

Week Seven: European Union – Oct. 10

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1991. Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community. *IO* 45 (19-56).

Pollack, Mark A. 1997. Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community. *IO* 51 (1):99-134.

Alter, Karen. 1998. Who Are the 'Masters of the Treaty'? European Governments and the European Court of Justice. *IO* 52 (1):121-48.

Sweet, Alec Stone, and Thomas L. Brunell. 1998. Constructing a Supranational Constitution. *APSR* 92 (1):63-81.

Tsebelis, George, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2001. The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union. *IO* 55 (2):357-90.

Schneider, Christina J. 2011. Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2):331-55.

Week Eight: International Trade Institutions – Oct. 17

[Review] Deardorff, Alan V., and Robert M. Stern. 2002. What You Should Know About Globalization and the World Trade Organization. *Review of International Economics* 10(3): 404-23. Also available via Deardorff's web site.]

Rosendorff, P. and Helen Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *IO* 54(4): 829-857.

Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *IO* 62(3): 477-505.

Rose, Andrew K. 2004. Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98-114.

Goldstein, Judith, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *IO* 61(1): 37-67.

Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *IO* 56(2): 339.

Week Nine: International Financial Institutions – Oct. 24

Stone, Randall W. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week Ten: Environment – Oct. 31

* Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1-3.

Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. *IO* 48 (3): 425-458.

Helm, Carsten and Detlef Sprinz. 2000. Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (5): 630-652.

Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. *IO* 59 (2):363-98.

Ringquist, Evan J. and Tatiana Kostadinova. 2005. Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol. *AJPS* 49 (1): 86-102.

Week Eleven: Human Rights – Nov. 7

Cole, W. M. 2005. Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment to the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966-1999. *American Sociological Review* 70 (3):472-95.

Neumayer, Eric. 2005. Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (6):925-53.

Kelley, Judith. 2007. Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements. *APSR* 101 (3):573-89.

Vreeland, James R. 2008. Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *IO* 62 (1):65-101.

Powell, Emilia Justyna, and J. K. Staton. 2009. Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation. *International Studies Quarterly* 53:149-74.

Gauri, Varun. 2011. The cost of complying with human rights treaties: The convention on the rights of the child and basic immunization. *Review of International Organizations* 6 (1):33-56.

Week Twelve: Regions- Nov. 14

Acharya, Amitav, and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds. 2007. *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Week Thirteen: The Future of IO Research – Nov. 21

Raustiala, Kal, and David G. Victor. 2004. The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. *IO* 58 (2):277-309.

Alter, Karen, and Sophie Meunier. 2009. The Politics of International Regime Complexity. *Perspectives on Politics* 7:13-24.

Abbott, Frederick M., and Duncan Snidal. 2010. International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration. *Review of International Organizations* 5 (3):315-44.

And others TBA

Week Fourteen: Dec. 5 (reserved for presentations)

Grading Policy

Devoted class participation is essential for this course's success; as such, students' final grades will depend in large part (25%) on their preparation, participation in class discussion, and general contribution to the course's intellectual climate. Additionally, each student will write three short (4-6 pages) papers that summarize and reflect on an individual week's readings. The papers should have an introduction and a conclusion, and are best modeled on book reviews in current political science journals (e.g., *Perspectives on Politics* or *International Studies Review*). Summaries integrated into a broader framework with greater focus on reflection will receive higher grades. Papers longer than six pages will not be graded and must be revised and resubmitted with a grade penalty. The grade penalty will also apply to late papers or those with unusual text sizes or margin settings (double-spaced 10-12 point fonts, 1 or 1.25 inch margins are standard). Each paper will count 15% of the course grade.

The last requirement is the composition (20%) and presentation (10%) of a research design. This paper should include 6-8 pages of critical literature review, along with identification of a research question, initial hypotheses, and potential data sources. Total paper length should not exceed 20 pages. The topics should be drawn from our readings, detailed above, or from special permission of the instructor. During the final class period, students will present their research design to the class in a simulated conference environment.

Course & Instructor Policies

Each class will begin with a brief summary from each student of his or her thoughts and impressions of the week's readings. Those comments might include questions of clarification, comparisons of the readings, limitations of existing research, and suggestions for extensions. Based on these initial remarks and prepared lecture, the instructor will present an agenda for discussion during the remainder of the class.

Students should inform the professor via email of any necessary absences, and should provide documentation if the absence is to be excused. Late papers will be penalized one letter grade for each day overdue.

UT Dallas Syllabus Policies and Procedures

The information contained in the following link constitutes the University's policies and procedures segment of the course syllabus. Please go to <http://go.utdallas.edu/syllabus-policies> for these policies.

These descriptions and timelines are subject to change at the discretion of the Professor.