

ECON 6343/POEC 7323 – Economic Regulation of Business

Course Syllabus

Course Information

<i>Course Number/Section</i>	ECO 6343 Section 001/POEC 7323 Section 001
<i>Course Title</i>	Economic Regulation of Business
<i>Term</i>	Fall '09
<i>Days & Times</i>	TR 4:00-5:15 P.M., CBW 1.105

Professor Contact Information

<i>Professor</i>	Dr. Barry J. Seldon
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<i>Email Address</i>	seldon@utdallas.edu (I prefer phone calls to email)
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<i>Office Hours</i>	Mon. 10:00-11:15 or by appointment (call to set appointment)
<i>Other Information</i>	Fax: 972-883-2735

Course Pre-requisites, Co-requisites, and/or Other Restrictions

It is assumed that the student has taken a graduate course in microeconomics such as those offered in the ECO or PPPE Ph.D. programs at UT-D or their equivalents at other universities, is comfortable with mathematics at the level of those classes, and has some knowledge of game theory. The student should also be able to interpret regression equations.

Course Description

This course considers four broad topics: 1.) the rationale for, and history of, government intervention in markets, 2.) direct government intervention, such as the regulation of particular industries by specialized government agencies, 3.) the deregulation movement, and 4.) indirect government intervention, such as laws regarding anticompetitive behavior and advertising. Our consideration of the rationale and history of government intervention includes the politics and economics which underlay the development of regulatory agencies and early antitrust laws in the U.S., as well as political and economic arguments for the institutions at the time of their inception. We will consider the regulation of price, quantity, entry and exit, and/or product quality in such industries as public utilities, communications, transportation, and pharmaceuticals; and we will consider antitrust laws. We will focus upon analyses of these regulations by considering how the behavior of firms is affected by regulation. To do so, we compare the behavior of firms in the absence of regulation to their behavior under regulation.

Student Learning Objectives/Outcomes

1. To understand the rationale for, and history of, government interventions in markets.
2. To analyze and evaluate direct and indirect government intervention in markets.
3. To analyze and evaluate how government intervention affects the behavior of the private sector.

Required Textbooks and Materials

Required Texts

W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., and John M. Vernon, *Economics of Regulation and Antitrust*, 4th ed. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press), 2005.

Readings from journals and other sources.

Two books are on reserve in the library for two hour take out:

Stephen Martin, *Advanced Industrial Economics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers), 2002. This might be a good supplementary resource for students not familiar with the general field of Industrial Organization.

Jean Tirole, *The Theory of Industrial Organization*, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press), 1988. This book is on reserve for students who did not take Industrial Organization. It has an excellent appendix on game theory. It is also available electronically. To get it, follow the following steps:

1. Go to the homepage of McDermott Library and use Library Catalog Quick Search to search for the book.
2. There are two books available. Click the title of the first book that is located at ebook.
3. Click "An electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click for information," which is a link to Netlibrary.
- 4 On the website of NetLibrary, the students can choose "Checkout for 2 Hours."

Required Materials

None.

Suggested Course Materials

Suggested Readings/Texts

None.

Suggested Materials

None.

Assignments & Academic Calendar

Topics, Reading Assignments, Due Dates, Exam Dates

A large component of this course involves the presentation and discussion of articles and readings by students. See the discussion under *Special Assignments* below.

COURSE OUTLINE

BOOK & JOURNAL ABBREVIATIONS (some references only appear only in the list of additional readings for the interested student, which follows the course outline):

VHV – Viscusi, Harrington, Vernon

AER – *American Economic Review*

BJE – *Bell Journal of Economics* (now the *Rand Journal of Economics*)

IJIO – *International Journal of Industrial Organization*

JEP – *Journal of Economic Perspectives*

JIE – *Journal of Industrial Economics*

JLE – *Journal of Law and Economics*

JPE – *Journal of Political Economy*

JRE – *Journal of Regulatory Economics*

REStat – *Review of Economics and Statistics*

RJE – *Rand Journal of Economics*

RIO – *Review of Industrial Organization*

SEJ – *Southern Economic Journal*

Note 1: Chs. 1, 2, and 4 of VHV will not be discussed at length in class; read them on your own. A general overview is the subject of the lecture on the first day of class.

Note 2: Associated with each chapter of VHV there are two or more articles. At least two of the articles will be presented in class by students, but students are responsible for reading all of them including any not discussed in class.

The schedule for the semester is as follows:

- Aug 20 & Aug 24-28 *Topic:* Introductory remarks on economic welfare and the history, politics, and economics of government intervention into markets
Readings: *VHV*, Chs. 1, 2, and 4.
- Aug 31-Sept 4
Sept 7-11 *Topic:* Introduction to antitrust economics and the effects of market structure on economic behavior of firms
Readings: *VHV*, Ch.3 - "Introduction to Antitrust"
W.J. Baumol, "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," *AER*, 72 (Mar. 1982), pp. 1-15.
G.J. Stigler, "A Theory of Oligopoly," *JPE*, 72 (Feb. 1964), pp. 44-61.
- Sept 14-18 & Sept 21-25 *Topic:* Anticompetitive behavior in oligopolies
Readings: *VHV*, Ch. 5 - "Oligopoly, Collusion, and Antitrust"
J.E. Harrington, Jr., "Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games Under a Finite Horizon," *International Economic Review*, 28 (Feb. 1987), pp. 1-14.
VHV, Ch. 6 - "Market Structure and Strategic Competition"
S.C. Salop and D.T. Scheffman, "Raising Rivals' Costs," *AER*, 73 (May 1983), pp. 267-71.
R. Schmalensee, "Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-eat Breakfast Cereal Industry," *BJE*, 9 (Autumn 1978), pp. 305-27.
- Sept 28-Oct 2 & Oct 5-9 *Topic:* Antitrust laws vs. market power
Readings: *VHV*, Ch. 7 - "Mergers"
K. Gugler, D.C. Mueller, B.B. Yurtoglu, and C. Zulehner, "The Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison," *IJIO*, 21 (May 2003), pp. 625-53.
F. M. Scherer, "A New Retrospective on Mergers," *RIO*, 28 (June 2006), pp. 327-341.
VHV, Ch. 8 - "Vertical Mergers and [Vertical] Restrictions".
G.F. Mathewson and R.A. Winter, "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," *RJE*, 15 (Spring 1984), pp. 27-38.
M.H. Riordan, "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," *AER*, 88 (Dec. 1998), pp. 1232-48.
- Oct 12-16 & Oct 19-23 *Topic:* Antitrust laws vs. anticompetitive behavior
Readings: *VHV*: Ch. 9 - "Monopolization and Price Discrimination"
D. Haddock, "Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive vs. Collusive Behaviors," *AER*, 72 (June 1982), pp. 289-306.
D. Genesove and W.P. Mullin, "Predation and its Rate of Return," *RJE*, 37 (Spring 2006), pp. 47-69.
R.J. Gilbert and M.L. Katz, "An Economist's Guide to *U.S. v. Microsoft*," *JEP*, 15, 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 25-44.
- Mid-Term Exam.**
- Oct 26-30 & Nov 2-6 *Topic:* Public Utility (direct) regulation
Readings: *VHV*, Ch. 10 - "Introduction to Economic Regulation"

G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," *BJE*, 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 3-21.
 R.A. Posner, "Theories of Economic Regulation," *BJE*, 5 (Autumn 1974), pp. 335-58.
 VHV, Ch. 11 - "Theory of Natural Monopoly"
 M. Waterson, Chapter 2, "Regulation and Natural Monopoly," *Regulation of the Firm and Natural Monopoly*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988, pp. 13-37.

Nov 9-13, *Topic: Natural (?) Monopolies*

Nov 16-20, *Readings: VHV, Ch. 12 - "Natural Monopoly Regulation and Electric Power"*
 J.B. Bushnell and E.T. Mansur, "Consumption under Noisy Price Signals: A Study of Electricity Retail Rate Deregulation in San Diego," *JIE*, 53 (Dec. 2005), pp. 493-513.
 M.W. Frank, "An Empirical Analysis of Electricity Regulation on Technical Change in Texas," *RIO*, 22 (June 2003), pp. 313-31.
 VHV, Ch. 13 - "Franchise Bidding and Cable Television"
 T. Chipty, "Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry," *AER*, 91 (June 2001), pp. 428-453.
 VHV, Ch. 14 - "Public Enterprise"
 J. Ros, "Does Ownership or Competition Matter? The Effects of Telecommunications Reform on Network Expansion and Efficiency," *JRE*, 15 (Jan. 1999), pp. 65-92.
 VHV, Ch. 15 - "Dynamic Issues in Natural Monopoly Regulation: Telecommunications"

Nov 23-27 *Topic: Non-Natural Monopolies*

& Nov 30-Dec 4 *Readings: VHV, Ch. 16 - "The Regulation of Potentially Competitive Markets..."*
 (Nov 26-27 is VHV, Ch. 17 - "Economic Regulation of Transportation"
 T'giving Break) D. E. Davis and W. W. Wilson, "Deregulation, Mergers, and Employment in the Railroad Industry," *JRE*, 15 (Jan. 1999), pp. 5-22.
 W.W. Wilson, "Cost Savings and Productivity in the Railroad Industry," *JRE*, 11 (Jan. 1997), pp. 21-40.
 N. L. Rose, "Fear of Flying? Economic Analysis of Airline Safety," *JEP*, 6 (Spring 1992), pp. 75-94.
 Winston, "U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation," *JEP*, 12 (Summer 1998), pp. 89-110.

Dec 10 *FINAL EXAM, 2:00-3:15¹*

¹ The date of the final exam is fixed according to University scheduling. Note that although the University allows for two hour use of the classroom, our Final Exam is designed for, and will be allocated, one hour and fifteen minutes.

ADDITIONAL READINGS FOR THE INTERESTED STUDENT:

--An additional (but not exhaustive) list of interesting readings (See me for more suggested readings on particular topics of interest). A "*" denotes a widely cited source:

--*Economic Welfare*

*R. Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," *JPE*, 83 (Aug. 1975), pp. 807-27

*H. Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency Vs. X-efficiency," *AER*, 56 (June 1966), pp. 392-414(?) (I'm not sure of the last page number)

--*Oligopoly Theory*

*M. Waterson, "Classical Theories of Oligopoly," and "Oligopoly: The Game Theoretic Approach," Chaps. 2 & 3 in Waterson's *Economic Theory of the Industry*, Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984.

--*Welfare Economics of Competition and Monopoly*

*Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, *Contestable Markets And the Theory of Industry Structure*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982.

W.A. Brock, "Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Article," *JPE*, 91 (Dec. 1983), pp. 1055-66.

K. Cowling and Dennis Mueller, "The Social Costs of Monopoly Power," *Economic Journal*, 88 (Dec. 1978), pp. 724-48.

J. P. Kalt and M. A. Zupan, "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," *AER*, 74 (June 1984), pp. 279-300.

*F.M. Fisher, "Diagnosing Monopoly," *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*, 19 (Summer 1979), pp. 7-33 (and comments on the article in the Summer 1980 issue).

D.R. Kamerschen, "An Estimation of the Welfare Losses From Monopoly in the American Economy," *Western Economic Journal* (now renamed *Economic Inquiry*), 4 (Summer 1966), pp. 221-36.

J.P. Kalt and M.A. Zupan, "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," *AER*, 74 (June 1984), pp. 279-300.

--*Antitrust*

*P. Areeda and D.F. Turner, "Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act," *Harvard Law Review*, 88 (Feb. 1975), pp. 697-733.

P. Ash and J. Seneca, "Is Collusion Profitable?" *REStat*, 58 (Feb. 1976), pp. 1-12.

B. J. Seldon, R. T. Jewell, and D. M. O'Brien, "Media Substitution and Economies of Scale in Advertising," *IJIO*, 18 (Dec. 2000), pp. 1153-80.

R.D. Blair and D.L. Kaserman, "Vertical Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy," *AER*, 68 (June 1978), pp. 397-402.

R. Blair and D. Kaserman, *Antitrust Economics*, Homewood Ill., Irwin, 1985.

D. Evans (ed.) *Breaking Up Bell*, New York, North-Holland 1983.

F. Fisher, J. McGowan, J. Greenwood, *Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and U.S. vs. IBM*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT press, 1983.

Note: The next four books are different editions of same title, but they have different articles:

*J. E. Kwoka and L. J. White (eds.), *The Antitrust Revolution* (1st ed.), Boston, Little, Brown, 1992.

*J. E. Kwoka and L. J. White (eds.), *The Antitrust Revolution* (2nd ed.), New York, HarperCollinsCollege Publishers, 1994.

*J. E. Kwoka and L. J. White (eds.), *The Antitrust Revolution* (3rd ed.), New York, Oxford University Press, 1999.

- *J. E. Kwoka and L. J. White (eds.), *The Antitrust Revolution* (4th ed.), New York, Oxford University Press, 2004.
- *J.S. McGee, "Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ) Case," *JLE*, 1 (Oct. 1958), pp. 137-69.
- *R. Posner, *Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976.
- G. Saloner, "Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information," *RJE*, 18 (Summer 1987), pp. 165-87
- M.R. Burns, "Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors," *JPE*, 94 (Apr. 1986), pp. 266-96.
- D. Scheffman and P. Spiller, "Geographic Market Definition Under U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines," *JLE*, 30 (April 1987), pp. 123-28.
- R. Schmalensee, "A Note of the Theory of Vertical Integration," *JPE*, 81 (March/April 1973), pp. 442-49.
- R.S. Hansen and R.B. Roberts, "Metered Tying Arrangements, Allocative Efficiency, and Price Discrimination," *SEJ*, 47 (July 1980), pp. 73-83.
- C. Fleshman and J. Willner, "Accounting for Social Costs Associated with Resale Price Maintenance," *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 23 (July 2005), pp. 429-35,
- R. Schmalensee, "Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies," *JLE*, 25 (April 1982), pp. 67-71.
- R. Schmalensee, "Antitrust and the New Industrial Economics," *AER*, 72 (May 1982) pp. 24-8.
- M. E. Slade, "The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited: Evidence from Newspaper Advertising," *SEJ*, 65 (Oct. 1998), pp. 204-222.
- *L.G. Telser, "Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?" *JLE*, 3 (Oct. 1960), pp. 86-108.
- L.G. Telser, "Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade II?" *JLE*, 33 (Oct. 1990), pp. 409-17. (A sequel, 30 years later.)
- *J.M. Vernon and D.A. Graham, "Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration," *JPE*, 79 (July/Aug. 1971), pp. 924-25.
- F.R. Warren-Boulton, "Vertical Control with Variable Proportions," *JPE*, 82 (July/Aug. 1974), pp. 783-802.
- *F.M. Westfield, "Vertical Integration: Does Product Price Rise or Fall?" *AER*, 71 (June 1981), pp. 334-46.
- *O.E. Williamson, "Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoff," *AER*, 58 (Mar. 1968), pp. 18-36.
- A.K. Klevorick, "The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing," *AER*, 83 (May 1993), pp. 162-67.
- Direct Regulation (Note: there are any number of books that discuss particular industries.)*
- *H. Averch and L. Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint," *AER*, 52 (Dec. 1962), pp. 1052-69
- R. Bornholz and D. S. Evans, "The Early History of Competition in the Telephone Industry," in D. S. Evans (ed.) *Breaking Up Bell*, New York, North-Holland, 1983, pp. 7-40.
- S. Breyer *Regulation and its Reform*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982.
- S. Brown and D. Sibley, *The Theory of Public Utility Pricing*, Cambridge U.K., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986.
- *H. Demsetz, "Why Regulate Utilities?" *JLE*, 11 (Apr. 1968), 55-65
- P.L. Joskow, "The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return in a Formal Regulatory Hearing," *BJE*, 3, (Autumn 1972)
- P.L. Joskow, "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Regulation," *JLE*, 17 (Oct. 1974) pp. 291-327
- D.E. Lehman and D.L. Weisman, "The Political Economy of Price Cap Regulation," *RIO*, 16 (June 2000) pp. 343-356.
- R. Poole, *Unnatural Monopolies: The Case for Deregulating Public Utilities*, Lexington Mass., D.C. Heath, 1985.
- W. Sharkey, *The Theory of Natural Monopoly*, Cambridge U.K., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982.

- *L. W. Weiss and M. W. Klass, *Regulatory Reform: What Actually Happened*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1986.
- D.L. Kaserman, J.W. Mayo, L.R. Blank, and S.K. Kahai, "Open Entry and Local Telephone Rates: The Economics of inter LATA Toll Competition," *RIO*, 14 (June 1999), pp. 303-19.
- *J. Wenders, "Peak Load Pricing in the Electric Utility Industry," *BJE*, 7 (Spring 1976), 232-41.
- G. Sellers, "Application of Antitrust to a Deregulated Electric Utility: The Future of Power Pooling," *The Journal of Energy and Development*, 18, (1994) pp. 95-121.
- T. J. Brennan and J. Boyd, "Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts," *JRE*, 11, (Jan. 1997) pp. 41-54.
- R. N. Rubinovitz, "Market Power and Price Increases for Basic Cable Service since Deregulation," *RJE*, 24 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-18.
- S. Borenstein, "The Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition," *JEP* 6 (Spring 1992), pp. 45-73.
- T. G. Moore, "Rail and Trucking Deregulation," in L. W. Weiss and M. W. Klass (eds.), *Regulatory Reform: What Actually Happened*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1986, pp. 14-39.
- R.G. Hubbard and R.J. Weiner, "Petroleum Regulation and Public Policy," in L. W. Weiss and M. W. Klass (eds.), *Regulatory Reform: What Actually Happened*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1986, pp. 105-36.
- R. D. Blair, D. L. Kaserman, and J. T. McClare, "Motor Carrier Deregulation: The Florida Experiment," *REStat*, 68 (Feb. 1986), pp. 159-84.
- J. Ellig and M. Giberson, "Scale, Scope, and Regulation in the Texas Gas Transmission Industry," *JRE*, 5 (March 1993), pp. 79-90.
- D. Alger and M. Toman, "Market-Based Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines," *JRE*, 2 (Sept. 1990), pp. 263-80.

--Social Regulation (Note: there are any number of books that focus upon particular regulations.)

- *R.H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," *JLE*, 3 (Oct. 1960), 1-44.
- B. P. Pashigian, "Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?," *Economic Inquiry*, 23 (1984) pp. 551-84
- B. J. Seldon, E. Elliott, J. L. Regens, and C. G. Hunter, "The Effect of EPA Enforcement Funding on Private-Sector Pollution-Control Investment," *Applied Economics*, 26 (Oct. 1994) pp. 949-955.
- *W. Y. Oi, "The Economics of Product Safety," *BJE*, 4 (Spring 1973), 3-28.
- W. K. Viscusi, "Wealth Effects and Earnings Premiums for Job Hazards," *REStat*, 60 (Aug 1978), pp. 408-416.
- J. Hersch and W. K. Viscusi, "Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and Differences in Wage-Risk Tradeoffs," *Journal of Human Resources*, 25 (1990), pp. 202-27.
- S. Peltzman, "The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation," *JLE*, 24 (Dec. 1981), 403-59.
- W. N. Evans and J. Graham, "Risk Reduction or Risk Compensation? The Case of Mandatory Safety-Belt Use Laws," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 4 (Jan. 1991), pp. 61-74.
- J. T. Scholz and Wayne B. Gray, "OSHA Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 3 (Sept. 1990) pp. 283-305.
- W. K. Viscusi and C. J. O'Connor, "Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling: Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?," *AER*, 74 (Dec. 1984), pp. 942-56.
- H. G. Grabowski and J. M. Vernon, "Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act," *JLE*, 35 (Oct. 1992), pp. 331-50.
- F. M. Scherer, "Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry," *JEP*, 7 (Summer 1993), pp. 97-115.
- I. Cockburn and R. Henderson, "Racing to Invest? The Dynamics of Competition in Ethical Drug Discovery," *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 481-519.

Grading Policy

Grades will be based on classroom participation (40%), a midterm exam (30%), and a final exam (30%). Each student is expected to lead the class discussion of a few readings, and students are expected to read and take part in all discussions of all readings. Classroom participation refers to presenting papers and taking part in the discussion of the paper. See the discussion concerning presenting and taking part in discussion in the section “Assignments # Academic Calendar.

Course Policies

Make-up exams

The student is expected to take the exam in class at the same time as his or her classmates. If the student does not take the exam with the rest of the class then he or she will be given a different exam from the rest of the class. The questions are likely to be more difficult, especially when the student has had more time to study than did his or her classmates.

Extra Credit

There is no extra credit. If you want to make a higher exam then study and work more diligently than you otherwise would and attend classes.

Late Work

You are expected to take exam in class with the rest of the class; see the policy on make-up exams above. It is very important that you present your readings in the class meeting assigned; presenting them later can be problematic to the flow of material. If you absolutely cannot make it to class when your presentation is due, let me know as soon as possible *before* the class begins. Late presentations will be scored lower.

Special Assignments

Presentation of Readings: The student who is leading the class discussion of a reading will present the reading, discussing its main points in as much detail as necessary so that the other students will understand the main points. However, the leader must not merely *read* sections of the reading. Merely reading sections shows little effort on the part of the leader. It also implies that you think your fellow students are not very bright, because they will have already read the article. Instead, prepare a talk as if you are lecturing to a class about the topic contained in the chapter, going into details where you think the reading is more difficult and “breezing” through easier parts. You may wish to rearrange the order of subtopics if you think it is appropriate. In addition to discussing the paper, the leader should discuss what he/she sees as strengths and weaknesses of the paper, as should the other students taking part in the discussion (in other words, *all* the other students).

Participation of Other Students during Presentations: The other students should contribute to the class discussion to the extent that they are able to contribute in a substantive manner. Other students should add pertinent points or disagree with the presenter or the reading, but they should not speak merely for the sake of speaking. Participation in the class discussion is a determinant of students’ grades (see the section on grading policy below), but taking up class time with inessential verbiage will not help the student. The instructor hopes that students will contribute to making the discussion of the readings interesting and instructive.

Class Attendance

Because class participation is extremely important in this course, it is very important that you attend. I know there may be a class or two that you will feel compelled to miss for some reason or other. In that case, you need not contact me; but you should contact a classmate or two and tell them you will need to get class notes from them. Being forewarned, your classmate(s) may take more complete notes than they otherwise would. In the event that you do miss a class, I strongly suggest getting notes from more than one classmate because different classmates will have different opinions about what is important.

Classroom Citizenship

Students are expected to conduct themselves in an orderly fashion that will allow delivery of the material by the professor or by other students and to be courteous and open-minded during class discussion.

Field Trip Policies / Off-Campus Instruction and Course Activities

None.

Student Conduct & Discipline

The University of Texas System and The University of Texas at Dallas have rules and regulations for the orderly and efficient conduct of their business. It is the responsibility of each student and each student organization to be knowledgeable about the rules and regulations which govern student conduct and activities. General information on student conduct and discipline is contained in the UTD publication, *A to Z Guide*, which is provided to all registered students each academic year.

The University of Texas at Dallas administers student discipline within the procedures of recognized and established due process. Procedures are defined and described in the *Rules and Regulations, Board of Regents, The University of Texas System, Part 1, Chapter VI, Section 3*, and in Title V, Rules on Student Services and Activities of the university's *Handbook of Operating Procedures*. Copies of these rules and regulations are available to students in the Office of the Dean of Students, where staff members are available to assist students in interpreting the rules and regulations (SU 1.602, 972/883-6391).

A student at the university neither loses the rights nor escapes the responsibilities of citizenship. He or she is expected to obey federal, state, and local laws as well as the Regents' Rules, university regulations, and administrative rules. Students are subject to discipline for violating the standards of conduct whether such conduct takes place on or off campus, or whether civil or criminal penalties are also imposed for such conduct.

Academic Integrity

The faculty expects from its students a high level of responsibility and academic honesty. Because the value of an academic degree depends upon the absolute integrity of the work done by the student for that degree, it is imperative that a student demonstrate a high standard of individual honor in his or her scholastic work.

Scholastic dishonesty includes, but is not limited to, statements, acts or omissions related to applications for enrollment or the award of a degree, and/or the submission as one's own work or material that is not one's own. As a general rule, scholastic dishonesty involves one of the following acts: cheating, plagiarism, collusion and/or falsifying academic records. Students suspected of academic dishonesty are subject to disciplinary proceedings.

Plagiarism, especially from the web, from portions of papers for other classes, and from any other source is unacceptable and will be dealt with under the university's policy on plagiarism (see general catalog for details). This course will use the resources of turnitin.com, which searches the web for possible plagiarism and is over 90% effective.

Email Use

The University of Texas at Dallas recognizes the value and efficiency of communication between faculty/staff and students through electronic mail. At the same time, email raises some issues concerning security and the identity of each individual in an email exchange. The university encourages all official student email correspondence be sent only to a student's U.T. Dallas email address and that faculty and staff consider email from students official only if it originates from a UTD student account. This allows the university to maintain a high degree of confidence in the identity of all individual corresponding and the security of the transmitted information. UTD furnishes each student with a free email account that is to be used in all communication with university personnel. The Department of Information Resources at U.T. Dallas provides a method for students to have their U.T. Dallas mail forwarded to other accounts.

Withdrawal from Class

The administration of this institution has set deadlines for withdrawal of any college-level courses. These dates and times are published in that semester's course catalog. Administration procedures must be followed. It is the student's responsibility to handle withdrawal requirements from any class. In other words, I cannot drop or withdraw any student. You must do the proper paperwork to ensure that you will not receive a final grade of "F" in a course if you choose not to attend the class once you are enrolled.

Student Grievance Procedures

Procedures for student grievances are found in Title V, Rules on Student Services and Activities, of the university's *Handbook of Operating Procedures*.

In attempting to resolve any student grievance regarding grades, evaluations, or other fulfillments of academic responsibility, it is the obligation of the student first to make a serious effort to resolve the matter with the instructor, supervisor, administrator, or committee with whom the grievance originates (hereafter called "the respondent"). Individual faculty members retain primary responsibility for assigning grades and evaluations. If the matter cannot be resolved at that level, the grievance must be submitted in writing to the respondent with a copy of the respondent's School Dean. If the matter is not resolved by the written response provided by the respondent, the student may submit a written appeal to the School Dean. If the grievance is not resolved by the School Dean's decision, the student may make a written appeal to the Dean of Graduate or Undergraduate Education, and the dean will appoint and convene an Academic Appeals Panel. The decision of the Academic Appeals Panel is final. The results of the academic appeals process will be distributed to all involved parties.

Copies of these rules and regulations are available to students in the Office of the Dean of Students, where staff members are available to assist students in interpreting the rules and regulations.

Incomplete Grade Policy

As per university policy, incomplete grades will be granted only for work unavoidably missed at the semester's end and only if 70% of the course work has been completed. An incomplete grade must be resolved within eight (8) weeks from the first day of the subsequent long semester. If the required work to complete the course and to remove the incomplete grade is not submitted by the specified deadline, the incomplete grade is changed automatically to a grade of F.

Disability Services

The goal of Disability Services is to provide students with disabilities educational opportunities equal to those of their non-disabled peers. Disability Services is located in room 1.610 in the Student Union. Office hours are Monday and Thursday, 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.; Tuesday and Wednesday, 8:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.; and Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

The contact information for the Office of Disability Services is:
The University of Texas at Dallas, SU 22
PO Box 830688
Richardson, Texas 75083-0688
(972) 883-2098 (voice or TTY)

Essentially, the law requires that colleges and universities make those reasonable adjustments necessary to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability. For example, it may be necessary to remove classroom prohibitions against tape recorders or animals (in the case of dog guides) for students who are blind. Occasionally an assignment requirement may be substituted (for example, a research paper versus an oral presentation for a student who is hearing impaired). Classes enrolled students with mobility impairments

may have to be rescheduled in accessible facilities. The college or university may need to provide special services such as registration, note-taking, or mobility assistance.

It is the student's responsibility to notify his or her professors of the need for such an accommodation. Disability Services provides students with letters to present to faculty members to verify that the student has a disability and needs accommodations. Individuals requiring special accommodation should contact the professor after class or during office hours.

Religious Holy Days

The University of Texas at Dallas will excuse a student from class or other required activities for the travel to and observance of a religious holy day for a religion whose places of worship are exempt from property tax under Section 11.20, Tax Code, Texas Code Annotated.

The student is encouraged to notify the instructor or activity sponsor as soon as possible regarding the absence, preferably in advance of the assignment. The student, so excused, will be allowed to take the exam or complete the assignment within a reasonable time after the absence: a period equal to the length of the absence, up to a maximum of one week. A student who notifies the instructor and completes any missed exam or assignment may not be penalized for the absence. A student who fails to complete the exam or assignment within the prescribed period may receive a failing grade for that exam or assignment.

If a student or an instructor disagrees about the nature of the absence [i.e., for the purpose of observing a religious holy day] or if there is similar disagreement about whether the student has been given a reasonable time to complete any missed assignments or examinations, either the student or the instructor may request a ruling from the chief executive officer of the institution, or his or her designee. The chief executive officer or designee must take into account the legislative intent of TEC 51.911(b), and the student and instructor will abide by the decision of the chief executive officer or designee.

Off-Campus Instruction and Course Activities

Off-campus, out-of-state, and foreign instruction and activities are subject to state law and University policies and procedures regarding travel and risk-related activities. Information regarding these rules and regulations may be found at the website address given below. Additional information is available from the office of the school dean. (http://www.utdallas.edu/BusinessAffairs/Travel_Risk_Activities.htm)

These descriptions and timelines are subject to change at the discretion of the Professor.