

PROSEMINAR IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Semester: Fall 2024

Course Number: PSCI 6321

Instructor: Dr. Sivaram Cheruvu	Time: Wed 4:00 - 6:45 PM
Email: sivaram.cheruvu@utdallas.edu	Place: CB 1.219

Course Description: Comparative politics is the study of political institutions and processes around the world. This course examines various approaches to the study of comparative politics, including structural, cultural, economic, and institutional theories of government. Students will gain an understanding of major theoretical works in comparative politics as well as empirical applications. Substantive topics include state development, democracy and democratization, party systems, authoritarian governments, economic growth, and civil conflict

Objectives: Students will become knowledgeable in the major themes within the academic literature in Comparative Politics. By engaging with contemporary events, students will be able to apply what they learn in class to the real-world outcomes. Other objectives include:

- To provide students with the conceptual and theoretical foundations for comparative political analysis
- To empower students to apply these contexts in both contemporary and historical settings
- To develop students analytical and research skills through critical reading and written application assignments

Office Hours: Tuesday 9 - 10 a.m or by appointment (Virtual or In Person in GR 3.802B)

Course Format: This course will be primarily discussion-based. Students are expected to have completed the assigned readings in preparation for class.

Grading Policy:

1. **Participation (20%):** Students are expected to actively participate in class each week. Students should come into class able to summarize the relevant arguments in the readings for the week, while also providing substantive critiques towards the theoretical and empirical strategies of the authors.
2. **Discussion Posts (20%):** Students will write four discussion posts regarding their selected week's readings on elearning of 500 words during the semester. Students will sign up for their weeks at the beginning of the semester on a google form. These posts are not a summary of the readings, but rather a way to critically engage with the substance and theory of the papers.
3. **Research Design (40%):** Each student will write a 10 - 12 page research design on a topic of their choice. The research design will include a statement of a theoretical question and/or puzzle, a review of the relevant literature, a theoretical argument, empirically testable hypotheses, the empirical method, and a description of the data required. More details will be given during the semester
4. **Research Design Presentations (20%):** The last two classes of the semester, students will present their research designs.

Class Attendance:

The University's attendance policy requirement is that individual faculty set their course attendance requirements. Regular and punctual class attendance is expected. Students who fail to attend class regularly are inviting scholastic difficulty. In some courses, instructors may have special attendance requirements; these should be made known to students during the first week of classes.

Class Participation:

Regular class participation is expected. Students who fail to participate in class regularly are inviting scholastic difficulty. A portion of the grade for this course is directly tied to your participation in this class. It also includes engaging in group or other activities during class that solicit your feedback on homework assignments, readings, or materials covered in the lectures (and/or labs). Class participation is documented by faculty. Successful participation is defined as consistently adhering to University requirements, as presented in this syllabus. Failure to comply with these University requirements is a violation of the Student Code of Conduct.

Class Recordings:

Students are expected to follow appropriate University policies and maintain the security of passwords used to access recorded lectures. Unless the Office of Student AccessAbility has approved the student to record the instruction, students are expressly prohibited from recording any part of this course. Recordings may not be published, reproduced, or shared with those not in the class, or uploaded to other online environments except to implement an approved Office of Student AccessAbility accommodation. Failure to comply with these University requirements is a violation of the Student Code of Conduct.

Academic Support Resources:

The information contained in the following link lists the University's academic support resources for all students. Please see <http://go.utdallas.edu/academic-support-resources>.

UT Dallas Syllabus Policies and Procedures:

The information contained in the following link constitutes the University's policies and procedures segment of the course syllabus. Please review the catalog sections regarding the credit/no credit or pass/fail grading option and withdrawal from class. Please go to <http://go.utdallas.edu/syllabus-policies> for these policies.

Course Schedule

Class 1 August 21: Introduction and how to read a research paper

Class 2 August 28: State Formation

Required Reading:

- Stasavage, David. 2010. When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies. *American Political Science Review* 104 (4): 625-632.
- Lessing, B. and Willis, G.D., 2019. Legitimacy in criminal governance: Managing a drug empire from behind bars. *American Political Science Review*, 113(2), 584-606.
- Sánchez De La Sierra, R., 2020. On the origins of the state: Stationary bandits and taxation in eastern congo. *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(1), 32-74.

Recommended Reading:

- Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. *The Sovereign State and its Competitors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 5, 6, and 8 (pp.77-129, 153-180).
- Herbst, J. (2000). *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press, Princeton
- Thies, C. G. (2005). War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3):451-465.
- Queralt, Didac. 2015. "From Mercantilism to Free Trade: A History of Fiscal Capacity Building." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 10: 221-273.
- Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 567-576.
- Abramson, S. F. and Carter, D. B. (2016). The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes. *American Political Science Review*, 110(4):675-698.
- Alesina, A., Easterly, W., and Matuszeski, J. (2011). Artificial States. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 9(2):246-77.
- Bates, R. H., Greif, A., and Singh, S. (2002). Organizing Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(5):599-628.
- Boix, C. (2015). *Political Order and Inequality*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Abramson, S.F., 2017. The economic origins of the territorial state. *International Organization*, 71(1), pp.97-130.
- Boone, C. (2003). *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Centeno, M. (1997). Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth Century Latin America. *American Journal of Sociology*, 102(6):1565-1605.
- Levi, M. (1988). *Of Rule and Revenue*. University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Spruyt, H. (1994). Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order. *International Organization*, 48(4):527-557.

Class 3 September 4: Economic development, colonialism, and democracy**Required Reading:**

- Paglayan, A.S., 2021. The non-democratic roots of mass education: evidence from 200 years. *American Political Science Review*, 115(1), pp.179-198.
- Banerjee, A. and Iyer, L., 2005. History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India. *American economic review*, 95(4), 1190-1213.
- Boix, C., 2011. Democracy, development, and the international system. *American political science review*, 105(4): 809-828.

Recommended Reading:

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Long-Run Changes in the Distribution of Prosperity. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4):1231-1294.
- Acemoglu, D. and Johnson, S. (2007). Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(6):925-85.
- Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., and Fink, G. (2014). Disease and development revisited. *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(6):1355-1366.
- Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland. (2010). "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143 (1-2): 67-101.
- Moore, Barrington. 1965. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R.R., 2012. Inequality and regime change: Democratic transitions and the stability of democratic rule. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3), pp.495-516.
- Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49 (2): 155-83.
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 : 69-105.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Collier, Ruth B. 1999. *Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nunn, N. (2008). The Long-term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1):139-176.
- Sen, A. (1998). The Concept of Development. In Chenery, H. and Srinivasan, T. N., editors, *Handbook of Development Economics*, volume 1. Elsevier Science Publishers.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Class 4 September 11: Democratic Backsliding**RESEARCH QUESTION DUE****Required Reading:**

- Little, A.T. and Meng, A., 2023. Measuring democratic backsliding. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, pp.1-13.
- Spenkuch, J.L. and Tillmann, P., 2018. Elite influence? Religion and the electoral success of the Nazis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1), pp.19-36.
- Graham, M.H. and Svobik, M.W., 2020. Democracy in America? Partisanship, polarization, and the robustness of support for democracy in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2), 392-409.

Recommended Reading:

- Waldner, D. and Lust, E., 2018. Unwelcome change: Coming to terms with democratic backsliding. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21(1), pp.93-113.
- Weingast, Barry. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *American Political Science Review* 91 (2): 245-263.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?" *Review of Economic Studies* 80 (3): 845-875.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 2003. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Capoccia, Giovanni. 2005. *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Berman, Sheri. 1997. "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic." *World Politics* 49 (3): 401-429.
- King, G., Rosen, O., Tanner, M. and Wagner, A.F., 2008. Ordinary economic voting behavior in the extraordinary election of Adolf Hitler. *The Journal of Economic History*, 68(4), 951-996.
- Capoccia, G. (2005). *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Satyanath, S., Voigtländer, N., and Voth, H.-J. (2017). Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party. *Journal of Political Economy*, 125(2):478-526.
- Levitsky S, Ziblatt D. *How democracies die*. Broadway Books; 2018.
- Meyerrose, A.M., 2020. The unintended consequences of democracy promotion: International organizations and democratic backsliding. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(10-11), 1547-1581.

Class 5 September 18: Ethnicity, Conflict, Cooperation, and Political Outcomes**Required Reading:**

- Jha, S., 2013. Trade, institutions, and ethnic tolerance: Evidence from South Asia. *American political Science review*, 107(4), pp.806-832.
- Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D.N. and Weinstein, J.M., 2007. Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?. *American political science review*, 101(4), pp.709-725.
- Beiser-McGrath, J., Müller-Crepon, C. and Pengl, Y.I., 2021. Who benefits? How local ethnic demography shapes political favoritism in Africa. *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(4), pp.1582-1600.

Recommended Reading:

- Kasara, K., 2007. Tax me if you can: Ethnic geography, democracy, and the taxation of agriculture in Africa. *American political science review*, 101(1), pp.159-172.
- Posner, D.N., 2004. The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4), pp.529-545.
- Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(4):1243–1284.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso Editions, London.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2000. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bates, R. H. (1983). Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa. In Rothchild, D. and Olorunsola, V. A., editors, *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
- Ichino, N. and Nathan, N. L. (2013). Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana. *American Political Science Review*, 107(2):344–361.
- Laitin, D. D. (1986). *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D. (1996). Explaining interethnic cooperation. *American Political Science Review*, 90(4):715–735.
- Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. *World Politics*, 56(3):328–362.
- Wilkinson, S. (2004). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Huber, J. D. (2017). *Exclusion by Elections: Inequality, Ethnic Identity, and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner. 2010. "Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (2): 494-510.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy*, 15(2):96–109.

Class 6 September 25: Electoral rules, Political Party formation, legislatures**Required Reading:**

- Tuttnauer, O. and Wegmann, S., 2022. Voting for votes: Opposition parties' legislative activity and electoral outcomes. *American Political Science Review*, 116(4), pp.1357-1374.
- Sheffer, L., Loewen, P.J., Soroka, S., Walgrave, S. and Sheafer, T., 2018. Nonrepresentative representatives: An experimental study of the decision making of elected politicians. *American Political Science Review*, 112(2), 302-321.
- Carroll, R. and Cox, G.W., 2012. Shadowing ministers: Monitoring partners in coalition governments. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(2), pp.220-236.

Recommended Reading:

- Dewan, T. and Spirling, A., 2011. Strategic opposition and government cohesion in Westminster democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 105(2), pp.337-358.
- Cox, Gary. 1999. "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 145-161.
- Cox, Gary. 1987. *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Michels, Robert. 1949. *Political Parties: a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Mair, Peter. 1994. "Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State." In Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair, eds., *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague. 1988. *Paper Stones*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman. 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (2): 329-342.
- Meguid, Bonnie M. 2005. "Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 347-59.
- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-5.
- Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Carey, John and Matthew Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Systems." *Electoral Studies*
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 1998. "From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon." *Comparative Politics* 30 (3): 293-312.
- Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2012. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands, and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (3): 571-597.
- Aldrich, John. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kam, Christopher. 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 14: 417-39.

Class 7 October 2: Federalism and decentralization**Required Reading:**

- Goldstein, R. and You, H.Y., 2017. Cities as lobbyists. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(4), pp.864-876.
- Grossman, G., Pierskalla, J.H. and Boswell Dean, E., 2017. Government fragmentation and public goods provision. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(3), pp.823-840.
- Li, Z., 2024. Subsidies for Sale: Postgovernment Career Concerns, Revolving-Door Channels, and Public Resource Misallocation in China. *The Journal of Politics*, 86(2), pp.704-719.

Recommended Reading:

- Lü, X. and Landry, P.F., 2014. Show me the money: Interjurisdiction political competition and fiscal extraction in China. *American political science Review*, 108(3), 706-722.
- Rodden, Jonathan. 2006. *Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Grossman, Guy and Janet Lewis. 2014. "Administrative Unit Proliferation." *American Political Science Review* 108 (1): 196-217
- Malesky, Edmund J., Cuong Viet Nguyen, and Anh Tran. 2014. "The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: a Difference-in-differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam." *American Political Science Review* 108 (1): 144-168
- Riker, William. 1964. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.
- Weingast, Barry. 2014. "Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development." *World Development* 53: 14-25.
- Rodden, Jonathan and Erik Wibbels. 2002. "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems." *World Politics* 54 (4): 494-531.
- Keleman, R. Daniel and Terence Teo. 2014. "Law, Focal Points, and Fiscal Discipline in the United States and the European Union." *American Political Science Review* 108 (2): 355-370.
- Fourinaies, Alexander and Hande Mutlu-Eren. 2015. "English Bacon: Copartisan Bias in Intergovernmental Grant Allocation in England." *Journal of Politics* 77 (3): 805-817.
- Brollo, Fernanda and Tommaso Nannicini. 2012. "Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil." *American Political Science Review* 106 (4): 742-761.
- Cai, Hongbin and Daniel Treisman. 2009. "Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 4 (1): 35-58.
- Malesky, Edward. 2008. "Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders." *Journal of Politics* 70 (1): 97-119.
- Landry, Pierre. 2009. *Decentralization Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Volden, Craig, 2002. "The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits?" *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2): 352-364.

Class 8 October 9: Authoritarian Regimes**Required Reading:**

- Esberg, J., 2021. Anticipating dissent: The repression of politicians in Pinochet's Chile. *The Journal of Politics*, 83(2), 689-705
- Croke, K., Grossman, G., Larreguy, H.A. and Marshall, J., 2016. Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes. *American Political Science Review*, 110(3), pp.579-600.
- Malesky, E., Schuler, P. and Tran, A., 2012. The adverse effects of sunshine: a field experiment on legislative transparency in an authoritarian assembly. *American political science Review*, 106(4), pp.762-786.

Recommended Reading:

- Gandhi, J. (2008). *Political Institutions under Autocracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Hollyer, J. R. and Wantchekon, L. (2015). Corruption and Ideology in Autocracies. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 31(3):499-533.
- Hsieh, C.-T., Miguel, E., Ortega, D., and Rodriguez, F. (2011). The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's *Maisanta*. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(2):196-214.
- King, G., Pan, J. and Roberts, M.E., 2013. How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression. *American Political Science Review*, 107(2), 326-343.
- Gehlbach, S. and Keefer, P. (2012). Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures. *Journal of Politics*, 74(2):612-635.
- Jensen, N. M., Malesky, E., and Weymouth, S. (2014). Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3):655-684.
- Wright, J. and Escriba-Folch, A. (2012). Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(2):283-309.
- Miller, M. K. (2015). Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(6):691-727.
- Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: The Politics of Party Hegemony and Its Demise*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Pepinsky, T. (2014). The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3):631-653.
- Reuter, O. J. (2017). *The Origins of Dominant Parties*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Rundlett, A. and Svobik, M. W. (2016). Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobbehavior in Electoral Fraud. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1):180-197.
- Svobik, M. W. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Gehlbach, S., Sonin, K., and Svobik, M. W. (2016). Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (19):565-84.
- Magaloni, B. (2008). Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5):715-41.

Class 9 October 16: Rebellion, Resistance, and Revolution**Literature Review, theory and hypotheses due****Required reading:**

- Berman, E., Callen, M., Felter, J.H. and Shapiro, J.N., 2011. Do working men rebel? Insurgency and unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(4), pp.496-528.
- Blair, G., Christine Fair, C., Malhotra, N. and Shapiro, J.N., 2013. Poverty and support for militant politics: Evidence from Pakistan. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), pp.30-48.
- Grasse, D., Sexton, R. and Wright, A., 2024. Courting Civilians During Conflict: Evidence from Taliban Judges in Afghanistan. *International Organization*, 78(1), pp.134-169.

Recommended Reading:

- Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D., 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American political science review*, 75-90.
- Lohmann, S. (1994). The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91. *World Politics*, 47(1):42-101.
- Christensen, D. and Garfias, F. (2018). Can You Hear Me Now? How Communication Technology Affects Protest and Repression. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 13(1):89-117.
- Pearlman, W. (2018). Moral Identity and Protest Cascades in Syria. *British Journal of Political Science*, 48(4):877-901. Bhavnani, R. R. and Jha, S. (2013). Forging a Non-Violent Mass Movement: Economic Shocks and Organizational Innovations in India's Struggle for Democracy.
- Cantoni, D., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., and Zhang, Y. J. (2019). Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(2):1021-1077.
- Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(6):1420-1443.
- Kern, H. L. and Hainmueller, J. (2009). Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes. *Political Analysis*, 17(4):377-399.
- McAdam, D. (1982). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Robertson, G. B. (2007). Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes. *American Political Science Review*, 101(4):781-798.
- Tarrow, S. (1996). *Power in Movement*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Kuran, T. (1991). Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7-48.
- Little, A. T. (2016). Communication Technology and Protest. *Journal of Politics*, 78(1):152-166.
- Lorentzen, P. L. (2013). Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8(2):127-158.

Class 10 October 23: Immigration and Political Preferences**Required Reading:**

- Fouka, V., 2019. How do immigrants respond to discrimination? The case of Germans in the US during World War I. *American Political Science Review*, 113(2), pp.405-422.
- Hangartner, D., Dinas, E., Marbach, M., Matakos, K. and Xefteris, D., 2019. Does exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile?. *American political science review*, 113(2), pp.442-455.
- Alrababa'h, A., Dillon, A., Williamson, S., Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D. and Weinstein, J., 2021. Attitudes toward migrants in a highly impacted economy: Evidence from the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(1), pp.33-76.

Recommended Reading:

- Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. "Attitudes Toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 61-84.
- Kim Ebert and Dina Okamoto. 2015. "Legitimizing Contexts, Immigrant Power, and Exclusionary Actions." *Social Problems*.
- Mathew J. Creighton and Amaney Jamal. 2015. "Does Islam Play a Role in Anti-Immigrant Sentiment? An Experimental Approach." *Social Science Research*.
- Scheve, K.F. and Slaughter, M.J., 2001. Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 83(1), pp.133-145.
- Matthew Wright, Morris Levy, and Jack Citrin. 2015. "Public Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy Across the Legal/Illegal Divide: The Role of Categorical and Attribute-Based decision-making." *Political Behavior*
- Daniel J. Hopkins, Van C. Tran, and Abigail Fisher Williamson. 2014. "See no Spanish: Language, Local Context, and Attitudes Toward Immigration." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 2(1): 35-51.
- Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, Alexandra Filindra, and Joshua J. Dyck. 2015. "When Partisans and Minorities Interact: Interpersonal Contact, Partisanship, and Public Opinion Preferences on Immigration Policy." *Social Science Quarterly*.
- Rui De Figueiredo and Zachary Elkins. 2003. "Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry Into the Vices of In Group Pride." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 171-188.

Class 11 October 30: Clientelism, Vote Buying, and Development**Required Reading:**

- Gulzar, S. and Pasquale, B.J., 2017. Politicians, bureaucrats, and development: Evidence from India. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1), pp.162-183.
- Williams, M.J., 2017. The political economy of unfinished development projects: Corruption, clientelism, or collective choice?. *American Political Science Review*, 111(4), pp.705-723.
- Lei, Z. and Zhou, J.A., 2022. Private returns to public investment: Political career incentives and infrastructure investment in china. *The Journal of Politics*, 84(1), pp.455-469.

Recommended Reading:

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Class 12 November 6: Partisanship and Accountability**Data and Empirical Method Due****Required Reading:**

- Bisgaard, M., 2015. Bias will find a way: Economic perceptions, attributions of blame, and partisan-motivated reasoning during crisis. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(3), 849-860.
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Recommended Reading:

- Bartels, B.L. and Kramon, E., 2020. Does public support for judicial power depend on who is in political power? Testing a theory of partisan alignment in Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 114(1), 144-163.
- Brader and Tucker, 2012, "Following the Party's Lead: Party Cues, Policy Opinion, and the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems," *Comparative Politics*
- Conroy-Krutz, Moehler, and Aguilar, 2016, "Partisan Cues and Vote Choice in New Multi-Party Systems," *Comparative Political Studies*
- Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002, *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford University Press. Chapters 2-4.
- Dominguez and McCann, 1995, "Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: The Construction of Party Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections," *American Political Science Review*
- Greene, 2011, "Campaign Persuasion and Nascent Partisanship in Mexico's New Democracy," *American Journal of Political Science*
- Huber, Kernell, and Leoni, 2005, "Institutional Context, Cognitive Resources, and Party Attachments Across Democracies," *Political Analysis*
- Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias, 2008, "Economics, Party, and the Vote: Causality Issues and Panel Data," *American Journal of Political Science*
- Liddle and Mujani, 2007, "Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies*
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Class 13 November 13: Information and Accountability**Required Readings**

- Martin, G.J. and Yurukoglu, A., 2017. Bias in cable news: Persuasion and polarization. *American Economic Review*, 107(9), pp.2565-99.
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Recommended Readings:

- Ferraz, C. and Finan, F., 2008. Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 123(2), pp.703-745.
- Boas and Hidalgo, 2011, "Controlling the Airwaves: Incumbency Advantage and Community Radio in Brazil," *American Journal of Political Science*
- Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya, 2011, "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia," *American Economic Review*
- Bidwell, Casey, and Glennerster, 2016, "Debates: Voting and Expenditure Responses to Political Communication," Working Paper
- Chong, De La O, Karlan, and Wantchekon, 2015, "Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification," *Journal of Politics*
- Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai, 2014, "Does Information Lead to More Active Citizenship? Evidence from an Education Intervention in Rural Kenya," *World Development*
- Banerjee, Green, McManus, and Pande, 2014, "Are Poor Voters Indifferent to Whether Elected Leaders are Criminal or Corrupt? A Vignette Experiment in Rural India," *Political Communication*
- Besley and Burgess, 2002, "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*
- Casey, 2015, "Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics," *American Economic Review*

Class 14 November 20: Research design presentations pt.1**Class 15** December 4: Research design presentations pt.2